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Incentives to Retire, 
the Employment of the Old, 
and the Employment of the 
Young in Sweden
Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson
10.1    Introduction
The idea that unemployment among younger people in a society could be 
counteracted by inducing exit from the labor market of older workers has 
been used as an argument for providing generous social security programs. 
In times of high unemployment rates among younger workers, or in con-
nection to ﬁ  rm closures, the public disability insurance program has been 
used in order to “save the jobs for the young.” Creating jobs for the young 
has even been the explicit motivation for a special government program, 
the so-  called Age-  Shift Allowance, which provided more generous retire-
ment options for an older worker requiring a younger worker to ﬁ  ll the 
position of the retired worker.
The validity of the argument that retirement of older workers increases the 
possibilities for younger workers of ﬁ  nding a job depends critically on two 
factors. First is the substitutability between younger and older workers in 
the production process. If older workers are not fully replaceable by younger 
ones, it will, of course, counteract any eﬀect on the unemployment rate 
of younger workers. Second, retirement of older workers will decrease the 
production in the economy. This will, in turn, decrease the overall demand 
in the economy and ultimately the demand for younger workers.
In this paper, we empirically examine the hypothesis that the increasing 
generosity of the social security system has decreased labor force participa-
tion among the elderly. We then investigate whether labor force participation 
among older workers aﬀects employment among younger workers.
Mårten Palme is professor of economics at Stockholm University. Ingemar Svensson is 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 10.2 gives an short description 
of the history of Sweden’s pension schemes. Section 10.3 investigates poli-
cies based on the argument for providing job opportunities for the young. 
Section 10.4 analyzes to what extent program provisions aﬀect employment 
of older workers. Section 10.5 presents the results from the analysis of the 
relation between labor force participation of older workers and employment 
of the young. Section 10.6 concludes.
10.2      A Short History of Swedish Pensions
In this section, we give a summary description of the diﬀerent compo-
nents of pension programs in Sweden and their development. More details 
pertaining to the period of our employment data series and a descriptive 
analysis of the relationship between program provisions and the labor mar-
ket participation of older workers are provided in section 10.4.
10.2.1      The Public Old Age Pension System
The ﬁ  rst public pension system was legislated in 1913 and implemented 
in January 1914.1 The process leading to this decision started in 1884. The 
law covered old age, disability, as well as survivor’s pensions. The beneﬁ  t had 
two components, a funded, contribution-  deﬁ  ned part and a means-  tested 
part. The system covered all citizens, not just workers like some other pen-
sion systems at that time.
In 1937, the funded and contribution-  deﬁ  ned pensions were replaced by 
a basic pension (a ﬁ  xed amount) ﬁ  nanced according to the pay-  as-  you-  go 
principle, and, in 1938, the means-  tested beneﬁ  ts were raised and diﬀer en-
tiated according to living costs in diﬀerent municipalities.
The next major reform was implemented in 1948. The basic pension was 
signiﬁ  cantly raised, and the relative importance of the means-  tested compo-
nent was reduced, and it was transformed to a means-  tested housing allow-
ance. The pension costs with these changes were expected to increase by 
more than 100 percent. Before the reform, a signiﬁ  cant share of pensioners, 
especially in the major cities, was still dependent on poverty relief from the 
municipalities. The goal of the reform was to more or less eliminate poverty 
among pensioners.
From 1949, the basic pension has been price indexed. Between 1953 and 
1968, the real value of the basic pension was also raised, thus giving all 
pensioners a share of the rapidly rising incomes of the working population 
during this period.
Even with these improvements of pension beneﬁ  ts, the replacement rates 
in the 1950s were low, except for low-  income workers. Other small groups 
with signiﬁ  cant replacement rates (around 65 percent) were government 
employees and some white-  collar workers in the private sector, who had 
1. The account until the early 1960s is based on Elmér (1960) and Molin (1965).Incentives to Retire, Employment of the Old and of the Young in Sweden    2 9 7
earnings-  related pension insurance. For these reasons, the issue of how to 
supplement the national basic pension with some kind of earnings-  related 
pension insurance became important on the policy agenda. After a series of 
government investigations and reports, starting in 1947, and after a referen-
dum in 1957 and an extraordinary election in 1958, the decision was ﬁ  nally 
taken in 1959 about the design of the supplementary pension system—the 
ATP scheme.
It was a mandatory system covering all employees. Self-  employed could 
choose to stay outside the system. Basically the system was pay-  as-  you-  go, 
but during the ﬁ  rst decades, signiﬁ  cant funds were built up in order not to 
depress national savings. Contributions to the new system were paid on earn-
ings starting in 1960, and the ﬁ  rst pensions were paid in 1963. The beneﬁ  t 
was based on an average of the best ﬁ  fteen years of earnings. Initially, a full 
pension beneﬁ  t required earnings above a threshold of one basic amount 
for twenty years.2 From cohort 1915, the required number of years was then 
raised by one year for each successive cohort up to thirty years. The implica-
tion of this transition rule was that until 1980, it was not possible to get a 
full ATP pension beneﬁ  t, and, until 1990, it was necessary to have earnings 
above the threshold each year between 1960 and retirement to receive a full 
beneﬁ  t.
After 1968, the real value of the basic pension was kept approximately 
constant, but in 1969 a new beneﬁ  t was introduced—the pension supple-
ment—in order to increase pension beneﬁ  ts for individuals without any 
or with only low ATP beneﬁ  ts. Thus, also during the 1970s, the minimum 
pensions were rising just like the ATP beneﬁ  ts were due to the maturing of 
the ATP scheme during the 1960s and 1970s.
During the 1990s, the major parties in the parliament agreed about 
a reform to replace the basic pension and the ATP schemes with a new 
scheme combining a funded contribution-  deﬁ  ned part with a pay-  as-  you-
 go  contribution- deﬁ   ned  part.  The  contribution  rate  for  the  former  is  2.5 
percent of earnings and for the latter 16 percent. These earnings-  related 
beneﬁ  ts are supplemented by a guarantee pension for residents in Sweden, 
obtainable from the age of sixty-  ﬁ  ve.
The reform was legislated in stages between 1994 and 2001. The new rules 
for pension entitlements were implemented in 1999, and the ﬁ  rst pensions 
from the new scheme were paid in 2003 (except for some early pensions 
during 2001 and 2002).
10.2.2    Occupational  Pension  Insurance
Already before the introduction of the public pension scheme in 1914, 
central government employees had signiﬁ  cant pension beneﬁ  ts, ﬁ  nanced by 
contributions divided between the employer and the employee. In the early 
2. The basic amount is closely linked to the Consumer Price Index and was introduced in the 
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twentieth century, similar schemes were also introduced for local govern-
ment employees.
Also, in the private sector, some employees were covered by voluntary 
pension insurance provided by the employer. Until the end of the 1950s, the 
coverage was however low, especially among blue-  collar workers, and the 
schemes often provided low beneﬁ  ts. Still, in the beginning of the 1950s, an 
occupational pension solution with better coverage was considered both by 
the Employer’s Confederation and the major unions as an alternative to a 
national supplementary pension scheme. In 1954, the Employer’s Confed-
eration proposed a system organized through collective contracts, with fees 
paid entirely by the employers and without any involvement from the state 
(Molin 1965, 192). At this time, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation 
(LO) had however opted for a mandatory public system.
In 1959, the same year as the ATP supplementary pension reform was 
decided by the Swedish parliament, negotiations started between the Em-
ployer’s Confederation and the major unions for white- collar workers in the 
manufacturing sector about how to adjust the existing employer-  provided 
pension insurances to the new situation. The result was a new occupational 
scheme, the ITP scheme, to be implemented in 1960. Consequently, from 
1960, most white-  collar workers in the private sector were covered both 
by the new national ATP scheme and the ITP scheme. The ITP agreement 
provided additional beneﬁ  ts to ATP and had a much higher ceiling than the 
public supplementary pension scheme. The retirement age also was lower 
than sixty- seven, which still applied to the ATP scheme. Men could retire at 
age sixty- ﬁ  ve with a beneﬁ  t of 65 percent of the ﬁ  nal salary. The pension age 
of women was originally sixty but was later raised to sixty-  ﬁ  ve.
In the beginning of the 1960s, the retirement age within the occupational 
schemes for government employees was also below sixty-  seven—between 
sixty and sixty-  ﬁ  ve depending on occupation. With the introduction of the 
ATP scheme, a rule for coordination was introduced in both schemes for 
government employees: the ATP pension was deducted from the beneﬁ  ts 
provided by the occupational schemes, that is, the occupational schemes 
were changed to give supplements to the growing public ATP pensions.
Finally, beginning in July 1973, blue-  collar workers in the private sector 
also were covered by an occupational scheme negotiated between the Em-
ployer’s Confederation and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO). 
This new STP scheme provided beneﬁ  ts between age sixty-  ﬁ  ve and the na-
tional retirement age of sixty- seven until the latter was changed to sixty- ﬁ  ve 
in 1976. In addition to this decrease of retirement age, the scheme provided 
lifelong beneﬁ  ts in addition to the public pensions just like the other three 
large occupational schemes with about the same replacement rate (10 per-
cent). In this case, however, there were no beneﬁ  ts replacing earnings above 
the ceiling within the ATP scheme.
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have undergone several revisions since their introduction. In 1977, the ITP 
scheme and, in 1991, the scheme for central government employees got 
supplementary-  funded and contribution-  deﬁ  ned components. During the 
last decade, there has been a general transition from deﬁ  ned- beneﬁ  t pay- as-
  you-  go schemes to funded deﬁ  ned-  contribution schemes.
10.2.3    Disability  Pensions
As mentioned at the outset, the 1913 pension law also contained regula-
tions for a disability (invalidity) pension. Until 1948, the old age and dis-
ability pensions were closely related in terms of ﬁ  nancing and beneﬁ  t rules. 
The diﬀerence was the eligibility criterion—age respective invalidity. An 
individual was entitled to pension beneﬁ  t before the age of sixty- seven if his 
or her working ability permanently was reduced by at least two-  thirds due 
to sickness or disability.
With the 1948 reform, the beneﬁ  t rules for old age and invalidity pensions 
became signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent. While the means-  tested component within 
old age pensions was signiﬁ  cantly reduced, the main part of the disability 
pension was still means tested. The implication of these rules was that a 
disabled person could earn labor income up to one-  third of normal earn-
ings of an individual of his education and place of residence without losing 
the right to disability pension, but the beneﬁ  t was reduced accordingly. In 
1948, a temporary disability beneﬁ  t (sjukbidrag) was also introduced for 
individuals who had lost their working ability for a signiﬁ  cant amount of 
time but not permanently.
Means testing as a way of providing partial beneﬁ  ts for individuals whose 
working ability was not completely lost was replaced by ﬁ  xed categories 
of partial beneﬁ  ts in the next major reform of disability insurance, which 
was implemented in 1963. This reform also coordinated the disability rules 
within the basic pension scheme and the new supplementary ATP pension 
scheme. From 1963, the law required that at least half of the individual’s 
working ability was lost and partial beneﬁ  ts of one-  third and two-  thirds 
were introduced for cases with some remaining working ability. As previ-
ously described, a full ATP pension by the old age pension transition rules 
was not possible until 1980. By the disability pension rules, however, an 
individual could receive a considerable supplementary ATP pension already 
in the beginning of the 1960s because “assumed pension points” from the 
year of pensioning until normal retirement age were added to pension points 
based on actual earnings. Thus, the economic incentives to retire with dis-
ability pension changed quickly with the 1963 reform and the introduction 
of the ATP supplementary scheme.
The next reform was implemented in July 1970, implying softer eligibil-
ity requirements for elderly workers. In the application of the law, workers 
aged sixty-  three or more were initially considered as elderly, but the age 
limit was lowered to sixty in 1975. The initiative to this reform came from 300        Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson
the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO). The proposal was to increase 
the possibilities to take labor market reasons into account in addition to the 
medical condition, and also to decrease the medical requirements when de-
ciding about disability pension for elderly workers.3 The purpose was to 
provide better income security for elderly workers displaced by structural 
change and for elderly workers with demanding working conditions. In the 
1970 reform, the lowest partial beneﬁ  t was also raised from one-  third to 
one-  half of full pension.
In July 1972, the eligibility criteria were extended even more. From this 
date, elderly long-  term unemployed could receive a disability pension with-
out any impairment of working ability due to sickness or disability.4 The 
original age limit of sixty-  three was lowered to sixty in January 1974.
Already, in 1979, the government expressed concern about the fact that 
male employment was decreasing in ages above sixty and that the employ-
ment of women in these ages did not increase in the same rate as for younger 
women. A commission was appointed to investigate what could be done in 
terms of labor market regulations, labor market policy, working conditions, 
pension policy, marginal tax rates and marginal eﬀects from the beneﬁ  t sys-
tems, and the attitudes to work at high ages to increase employment among 
elderly workers.5 The commission delivered its report in 1983. No speciﬁ  c 
policy proposals to promote employment of the elderly were put forward. 
The economic recession and the high unemployment rates in all ages at that 
time were stated as motives for this decision.
The growing use of labor market reasons within the disability pension 
system, well beyond the original social reasons for the rules, was, however, 
the subject of growing concern during the 1980s, and, ﬁ  nally, these rules were 
abolished in October 1991. This policy was part of a series of measures to 
extend the traditional “work principle” within Swedish labor market policy 
also to sickness and disability insurance.6 However, it was still possible to 
take labor market considerations into account in decisions about disability 
pension for workers above age sixty according to the rules introduced in 
July 1970. In January 1997, these special rules for elderly workers also were 
abolished.
In 2003, a major revision of disability insurance was implemented, in part 
due to necessary adjustments because of the reform of old age pensions. The 
rules for calculation of the earnings-  related beneﬁ  t that had been in place 
since 1963 were replaced with new rules meant to insure current income 
3. To some extent, this was true also for nonelderly workers.
4. From this date, the term “disability pension” is, of course, misleading because the system 
for elderly workers now is a combined disability and unemployment insurance. After the 1963 
reform, the system was in Swedish called Förtidspension, which literally translated means “early 
retirement pension.”
5. See SOU (1983:62, 11–12).
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rather than historical income. Disability insurance was transferred from 
the pension to the sickness insurance scheme. The reform also introduced 
diﬀerent rules for individuals aged nineteen to twenty-  nine and thirty to 
sixty-  four. These changes were made to emphasize that disability insurance 
was not meant to provide lifelong beneﬁ  ts, especially not for the young.
10.3      Job Opportunities for the Young as an 
Argument in Swedish Pension Policy
Ever since 1884, the pension system has been subject of more or less con-
stant analysis, debate, and reform. Reforms of both the old age and disability 
pension systems have been prepared in government committees, normally 
with members from all the major parties in the parliament and often includ-
ing ambitious empirical research. The schemes and reforms have often also 
been the subject of heated political debate. At two occasions, in 1936 and 
1958, pension policy was also major issues in the elections.
The arguments that have been important are those about aﬀordability 
considering other needs, coverage, funded versus nonfunded, and voluntary 
versus mandatory systems and the principles and details of beneﬁ  t calcula-
tion. Reforms have been driven mainly by concerns about income security 
and income standard of older workers and pensioners and the eﬀects of 
diﬀerent options on the economy.
As far as we know, the argument that retirement of older workers should 
be facilitated in order to increase job opportunities for the young have been 
put forward among legislators only on two occasions in Sweden: in the 1930s 
and in the 1990s. On both occasions, the economy was severely depressed, 
with high unemployment rates, especially among young workers. During 
the 1990s, long-  term unemployment peaked in 1996 (except for male young 
workers where the peak was already in 1993) and then decreased gradually 
until year 2000.
In the 1930s, the idea of replacing old by young workers was put forward 
by some members of the parliament from the Conservative party headed 
by professor Gösta Bagge (Molin 1965, 8).7 The proposal was that the state 
should subsidise employers to provide pensions for workers above age sixty-
 ﬁ  v e.   I n   1 9 3 5 ,   a   l i b e r a l   m e m b e r   o f   t h e   p a r l i a m e n t   p r o p o s e d   m a n d a t o r y   s u p -
plementary pensions for all private sector employees, again with decreasing 
unemployment among young workers as one of the purposes (Molin 1965, 
8–9). Neither of these proposals found support in the parliament.
In 1998, the Social Democratic government introduced a new program 
among the many active labor market programs tried during the 1990s: 
the Generational Switching Allowance. The scheme made it possible for 
7. Gösta Bagge was professor of Social Policy and Economics at Stockholms Högskola and 
leader of the Conservative party from 1935 to 1944.302        Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson
a worker aged at least sixty-  three to retire with a beneﬁ  t corresponding to 
the unemployment beneﬁ  t if the employer agreed to employ a long-  term 
unemployed individual aged twenty to thirty-  ﬁ  ve. The employer was also 
required to contribute to the ﬁ  nancing with 25 percent. Application for the 
allowance was only possible during 1998. Only around 840 individuals used 
the allowance.
Neither the proposal from the Conservatives in the 1930s, nor the Gen-
erational Switching Allowance was about major program provisions of old 
age or disability insurance like retirement ages or other eligibility criteria. 
They were speciﬁ  c subsidies meant to be temporary.
However, it seems clear that labor market conditions for the young due 
to the business cycle had an impact on policy. The decision to abolish pure 
labor market reasons in disability insurance was taken not in 1983, when 
there was a serious recession and the Swedish industry was subject to large-
  scale structural change, but in 1989, when there was an exceptional boom 
in the Swedish economy.
Also, the idea that early retirement of the old might improve job oppor-
tunities among the young apparently has some appeal among the general 
population. The idea of a Generational Switching Allowance was put for-
ward in 1997 by a government commission for the review of youth policies 
in Sweden.8 The commission organized local meetings with around 1,800 
young Swedes and also ordered a survey among the population aged ﬁ  fteen 
to twenty-  ﬁ  ve. A decrease of the retirement age was a frequent proposal at 
the meetings and also found support in the survey. The commission argued 
against a general decrease of retirement ages with the argument that such 
measures in Denmark, Holland, and France has not helped to reduce unem-
ployment, but argued for retirement through generational switching and 
also for subsidized career breaks if the employer gives job to an unemployed 
worker.9
10.4      Program Provisions and the Employment of Older Workers
As in most other industrialized economies, the increasing female labor 
force participation and the decreasing labor force participation of older 
male workers are two of the main changes of Sweden’s labor force in recent 
decades. Figure 10.1 shows the development of labor force participation 
rates in diﬀerent age groups for male and female workers, respectively. An 
apparent change in the labor force is the long-  term decline of the share of 
the male group aged between sixty and sixty- four as well as a decline in male 
8. See SOU (1997:40).
9. Subsidized career breaks were introduced in twelve municipalities in 2002 and for the whole 
country in 2005. An evaluation of this policy is in Nordström Skans and Lindqvist (2005).Fig. 10.1    Labor force participation rates in Sweden 1963–2006: A, Males by 
diﬀerent age groups; B, Females by diﬀerent age groups
Source: Various reports of the Swedish Labor Force Survey, provided by Statistics Sweden.
A
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labor force participation of those older than age sixty-  ﬁ  ve in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. An apparent candidate for the explanation to this development 
is the build up of the Swedish income security system since the early 1960s. 
In this section, we investigate how these changes aﬀected economic incen-
tives to leave the labor market.
10.4.1      The Old Age Public Pension System and Occupational Pensions
The introduction and maturity of the supplementary pension program 
(ATP) and the lowering of the normal retirement age are the two most 
important changes for old age pensions in Sweden during the period under 
study. Because white-  collar workers in the private sector as well as employ-
ees in the public sector did have negotiated pension plans before ATP was 
implemented, the ATP reform did primarily aﬀect blue-  collar workers in 
the private sector. This development is revealed in ﬁ  gure 10.2, which shows 
the development of average pension beneﬁ  t and diﬀerent pension sources 
by year of birth for cohorts retired between 1955 and 1982, estimated from 
a cross section in 1983. Each panel shows one of the four occupational pen-
sion groups.
For the earlier cohorts, the sampling error is large, and there is probably 
an upward bias due to diﬀerential mortality by income. Still the results in 
ﬁ  gure 10.2 reveal a clear pattern. For former employees in the public sector, 
the introduction of the supplementary pension program is to a large extent 
crowded out by lower occupational pension beneﬁ  ts. This is because of the 
rules for coordination between the ATP and occupational schemes described 
in section 10.2. For former white- collar workers in the private sector, there is 
much less of “crowding out” from the occupational pension scheme. How-
ever, the largest relative improvement is for blue- collar workers in the private 
sector, who before the introduction of ATP in general had no or very low 
occupational pension beneﬁ  ts.
Also, the level of the basic pension has increased since the early 1960s. 
Figure 10.3 shows this development for both the old age and the disability 
pension beneﬁ  ts. Most of the increase can be attributed to the introduction 
of the special supplement beneﬁ  t, which is a beneﬁ  t targeted at pensioners 
with no or very low supplementary beneﬁ  t. The divergence of the two graphs 
in ﬁ  gure 10.3 represents the introduction of a double special supplement for 
the disability pension beneﬁ  t.
Table 10.1 shows normal, early, and delayed retirement ages in the na-
tional old age pension system. Before the introduction of ATP, pension 
could only be claimed from age sixty-  seven. When the income-  related ATP 
scheme was introduced, both the basic and the supplementary part became 
accessible starting from age sixty- three with a 0.6 percent actuarial reduction 
for each month of early withdrawal before age sixty- seven. In 1976, the nor-
mal retirement age was decreased to sixty-  ﬁ  ve and the actuarial reduction 
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change in the normal retirement age did only aﬀect workers not covered by 
the main occupational pension programs, such as farmers and homemak-
ers. White-  collar workers in the private sector had an agreement on normal 
retirement age at sixty- ﬁ  ve already in 1960 and public- sector workers’ retire-
ment ages between sixty and sixty-  ﬁ  ve, depending on type of occupation. 
Finally, blue-  collar workers in the private sector had an agreement in 1973 
on normal retirement age at sixty-  ﬁ  ve.
The eﬀect of the changes in the normal retirement ages is apparent in 
ﬁ  gure 10.1, showing the development of labor force participation rates in 
diﬀerent age groups. The graph for the group aged between sixty-  ﬁ  ve and 
seventy- four declines rapidly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that is, during the 
period when the lower retirement ages were introduced in diﬀerent sectors 
Fig. 10.3    Level of basic pension beneﬁ  t from the national pension scheme
Table 10.1  Normal, early, and delayed retirement ages along with actuarial 
adjustment factors in the national old age pension system
Period   NR   ER   UR  
Reduction 
per month, 
% of beneﬁ  t  
Increase 
per month, 
% of beneﬁ  t
1914–1962 67
1963–1976 (June) 67 63 72 0.6 0.6
1976 (July)–1990 (June) 65 60 70 0.5 0.5
1990 (July)–1997 65 60 70 0.5 0.7
1998–   65   61   70   0.5   0.7
Note: NR   normal retirement; ER   early retirement; UR   delayed retirement.Incentives to Retire, Employment of the Old and of the Young in Sweden    3 0 7
of the economy. After 1976, the labor force participation rate has remained 
on a very low level in this age group.
The introduction of an income-  related supplementary pension system, 
the increase of the minimum pension level, and the lowering of retirement 
ages are likely to have two contradictory eﬀects on incentives to remain on 
the labor market. First, for at least some workers, because the beneﬁ  t levels 
are substantially increased, it will create a wealth eﬀect toward earlier exit 
from the labor market, provided that leisure is a normal good. The lower-
ing of the normal retirement ages had similar eﬀect. Second, because the 
supplementary pension system, as opposed to the prereform basic pension, 
is related to the contributions made to the scheme the gain from remaining 
in the labor force increases during the years of maturity of the ATP scheme. 
Both the basic and the ATP schemes also include an actuarial reduction for 
those who start to claim beneﬁ  ts before the normal retirement age and an 
actuarial addition for those who delay retirement. This will create an incen-
tive to remain in the labor force.
The resulting time series indexes of the average incentives faced by persons 
who retire in each year are shown in ﬁ  gure 10.4. This graph summarizes all 
changes in the social security system described in the preceding. It has, as 
expected, an upward trend in social security wealth illustrating the greater 
incentives to retire earlier through an income eﬀect from the various reforms 
in the recent decades. The growth of the economy also contributed to the 
increasing trend for social security wealth. But also the gain to postponing 
Fig. 10.4    The development social security wealth and social security wealth minus 
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retirement, measured by the peak value, increases, at least in the beginning 
of the period.
To sum up, we have two contradictory eﬀects over time on incentives to 
remain on the labor market, and, as ﬁ  gure 10.1 reveals, the trend for labor 
force participation of men and women go in the opposite direction. For 
reasons explained in the next subsection, there is also reason to believe that 
the decreasing labor force participation of elderly male workers is related 
to the provisions within the disability scheme rather than to the incentives 
created by the old age pension scheme.
Our conclusion from these facts is that it is hard to ﬁ  nd any connection 
between the time series of incentives to retire and the labor force participa-
tion of elderly workers. This is, however, not contradicting our previous 
results where we ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant eﬀects with the expected signs of incen-
tives on retirement behavior in a cross section of individuals, where there 
are many sources of identifying variation in the data (Palme and Svensson 
2004). Also, the result is consistent with the cross- country analysis in Gruber 
and Wise (1999). The incentives from the earnings-  related old age pension 
scheme with actuarial adjustments for early and postponed retirement help 
keep the average retirement age through the old age pension pathway com-
paratively high (it has been around sixty-  ﬁ  ve since the middle of the 1970s, 
i.e., close to the normal retirement age).
10.4.2      The Disability Insurance Program
In section 10.2, we described how the eligibility rules for disability pen-
sion changed signiﬁ  cantly in 1970 and how the system was transformed 
into a combined sickness and unemployment insurance in 1972. The 1972 
rules were abolished in 1991 and the 1970 rules in 1997. This development 
is summarized in table 10.2.
Figure 10.5 shows the available data on the number of new disability pen-
sions per year during the period 1961 to 2006. There was a very big increase 
in connection with the 1970 reform. There was again an increase in the 
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–1962 Yes Very small No No
1963–1970 (June) Yes Some No No
1970 (July)–1972 (June) Yes Yes Yes, aged 63–66 No
1972 (July)–1974 (June) Yes Yes Yes, aged 63–66 Yes, aged 63–66
1974 (July)–1976 (June) Yes Yes Yes, aged 60–66 Yes, aged 60–66
1976 (July)–1991 (Sept) Yes Yes Yes, aged 60–64 Yes, aged 60–64
1991 (Oct)–1996 Yes Yes Yes, aged 60–64 No
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middle of the 1980s. This coincided with a more extensive use of the pure 
labor market reasons introduced in the 1972 law. The use of these reasons 
peaked in 1985 when around 20 percent of the new pensions were for reasons 
without any medical condition. After 1990, the rates have ﬂ  uctuated a lot, 
but the average number of new pensioners has been on the same level as 
during the late 1980s.
Figure 10.6 shows that the growth of the stock of disability pensioners 
among males aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four corresponds closely to the growth 
of males outside the labor force in the same age group in the period 1968 to 
1990. Although there is some mismatch between these series due to partial 
disability beneﬁ  ts, the correspondence between these series of data motivates 
the conclusion that disability pension was the dominating pathway to retire-
ment below age sixty-  ﬁ  ve during these decades.
After the eligibility rules for labor market reasons were abolished in 1991, 
the task of providing unemployment insurance was taken over by the occu-
pational systems. Between 1991 and 1994, the number of individuals in 
the age group ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four having occupational pension beneﬁ  ts 
as their main income source increased from 1.3 to almost 4 percent, thus 
accounting for a signiﬁ  cant part of the gap between the stock of disabil-
ity pensioners and the total number of individuals outside the labor force 
that appeared at that time according to ﬁ  gure 10.6.10 After 2002, the num-
ber of men on occupational pension decreased, but the number of women 
remained around 4 percent still in 2005.
After 1998, the labor force participation among males aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to 
Fig. 10.5    Annual number of new disability pensions, 1951–2006
10. This is deﬁ  ned as at least 80 percent of total annual income from work or transfer pay-
ments. The estimate is from our own calculations on income statistics provided by Statistics 
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sixty-  four has increased signiﬁ  cantly. This change coincides in time with 
the abolition of the special eligibility rules for elderly workers introduced in 
1970. As we have shown elsewhere (Karlstrom, Palme, and Svensson 2008), 
at least initially there was no positive eﬀect on the number of individuals 
actually working from this reform. In the ﬁ  rst few years after the reform, 
the number of long-  term unemployed and the number of individuals with 
long sickness beneﬁ  t periods increased. The ﬁ  rst and often also the second 
of these groups are included in the labor force along with those who are 
actually working.
10.5      Is there a Relation between Employment 
of Older and Younger Workers?
To investigate the potential relation between employment of older and 
younger workers, let us ﬁ  rst take a look at the development of the aggregate 
series. Figure 10.7 shows labor force participation rates for male and female 
worker aged between ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve and sixty- four as well as between sixteen and 
twenty-  four, respectively, along with unemployment rates for the younger 
age group from 1963 and onward. The main changes in the income security 
programs are marked with vertical lines in the ﬁ  gure. The changes in the old 
age pension program, marked with solid lines, include the introduction of 
the supplementary pension program in 1963 and the decrease in the normal 
retirement age from age sixty-  seven to sixty-  ﬁ  ve in 1976.
The development of labor force participation for the age group ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve 
Fig. 10.6    Share with disability pension (including partial pensions) and share out-
side the labor force, males aged 55–64Incentives to Retire, Employment of the Old and of the Young in Sweden    3 1 1
to sixty- ﬁ  ve shows a slight positive trend from around 65 percent in the early 
1960s to almost 75 percent by the end of the period under study. The driv-
ing force behind this increase is the rapid overall increase of female labor 
force participation in the Swedish economy. There is no apparent eﬀect of 
any of the changes in the income security programs marked in ﬁ  gure 10.7 
on the labor force participation rates of the older workers. However, such 
changes may be masked by the overall increase in the female labor force 
participation.
For the labor force participation rate of the younger age group, there is a 
sharp drop in the economic recession in the early 1990s, when it drops from 
around 70 to around 50 percent. A similar shift can be seen for the unem-
ployment rate for this age group. However, as opposed to the labor force 
participation rate, the unemployment rate decreases to a lower level after 
the initial increase, although the postrecession level is substantially higher 
than the stable level before the recession. The main reason behind the lower 
labor force participation rate for the young age group is that the education 
programs introduced in the recession tended to be permanent as well as a 
major build up of higher education starting in the early 1990s.
There is no apparent covariation between the development of labor force 
participation of the older workers and the unemployment rate of the young. 
Although the increase in youth unemployment in the 1970s is accompanied 
with a slight increase in labor force participation of the elderly, the decline in 
youth unemployment in the 1980s was not accompanied by a decline in labor 
force participation of the elderly. Also, the huge increase in youth unemploy-
ment in the early 1990s was apparently driven by the economic recession 

































































































Fig. 10.7    LFP of older workers, LFP of younger workers, unemployment of the 
young, and major changes in the income security systems: Males and females pooled312        Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson
Figure 10.8 shows the same development as in ﬁ  gure 10.7, but now the 
data is conﬁ  ned to male workers in order to exclude the eﬀect of the trend in 
female labor force participation. The development of the labor force partici-
pation rate for the older age group can be interpreted as an eﬀect of changes 
in the income security programs: the decline starting in the early 1970s fol-
lows the more generous eligibility rules implemented in the early 1970s. The 
slight increase follows in particular the abolition of the special eligibility 
rules for older workers in the Disability Insurance. Again, it is not possible 
to interpret the changes in the development of youth unemployment to be 
driven by changes in labor force participation of the old.
The relation between labor force participation rates of older workers and 
unemployment rates in younger age groups are further investigated in ﬁ  gure 
10.9, which shows labor force participation rates for the age group ﬁ  fty-
 ﬁ  v e   t o   s i x t y -  ﬁ  v e ,   a l o n g   w i t h   t h e   d e v e l o p m e n t   o f   t h e   u n e m p l o y m e n t   r a t e  
for young workers aged sixteen to twenty-  ﬁ  ve, as well as that of prime aged 
workers aged between twenty- ﬁ  ve and ﬁ  fty- four. To facilitate the interpreta-
tion of covariations, the unemployment rate is measured on the right-  hand 
scale, and the labor force participation rate is shown on the left-  hand one.
The results in ﬁ  gure 10.9 shows that the unemployment rate among prime 
aged workers is much less volatile than that of younger workers. Also, the 
trend toward an increased youth unemployment starting in the early 1960s 
until the early 1980s is not present for the prime aged workers. Thus, the trend 
toward a higher labor force participation rate among older workers was not 
reﬂ  ected in a corresponding trend of higher unemployment rate among the 
prime aged. The development since the early 1990s is also hard to interpret 
as supporting the view of a covariation between the labor force participation 



































































































Fig. 10.8    LFP of older workers, LFP of younger workers, unemployment of the 
young, and major changes in the income security systems: MalesIncentives to Retire, Employment of the Old and of the Young in Sweden    3 1 3
Figure 10.10 shows the development of labor force participation rates for 
the three main age groups. The slight increase in labor force participation 
rates for both older workers and the prime aged can be attributed to the very 
large increase in female labor force participation. Again, it is not possible 
to interpret the data as the development of labor force participation of the 
old are related to that of any of the other groups.
Another way to study the relation between labor force participation of 
the old and employment of younger workers is through regression analysis. 











































































































Fig. 10.9    LFP of older workers, unemployment rates of younger and prime age 



































































































Fig. 10.10    LFP of diﬀerent age groups: Males and females pooled314        Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson
(1)  Uyoung,t        LFPold,t    Xt   εt,
where Uyoung,t measures the unemployment rate in the young age group, 
LFPold,t is the labor force participation rate among older workers, Xt other 
observable characteristics also likely to aﬀect the unemployment rate of the 
young, and, ﬁ  nally, εt measuring unobservable characteristics and functional 
form deﬁ  ciencies aﬀecting the dependent variable.
Table 10.3 shows the results where diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations of equation (1) 
have been estimated when the data on males and females have been pooled. 
The upper panel of table 10.3 shows the results from speciﬁ  cations where the 
vector of controls has been excluded and the lower panel from those where 
it has been included. Each column represents one outcome variable. For the 
young age group, we have three diﬀerent outcomes: the unemployment rate 
(UE), the employment rate (EMP), and the share in schooling (SCH). For 
the prime aged group, we have only two outcomes: the unemployment rate 
(UE) and employment (EMP). Table 10.4 shows the corresponding results 
to the upper panel of table 10.3 for males and females separately, that is, 
when controls are excluded, and table 10.5 shows the results separately for 
males and females corresponding to the lower panel of table 10.3, that is, 
when controls are included in the speciﬁ  cation.
Table 10.3  Direct relationship between the elderly labor force participation and the 
employment and unemployment of young and prime age individuals (men 
and women combined)
Youth 16–24 Prime 25–54
    UE   EMP   SCH   UE   EMP
Levels 0.129 –0.579 0.698 0.112 0.337
(0.024) (0.129) (0.080) (0.020) (0.059)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
0.135 –0.680 0.741 0.129 0.227
(0.025) (0.128) (0.073) (0.021) (0.069)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.136 1.612 –0.728 –0.222 1.058
(0.146) (0.440) (0.234) (0.105) (0.164)
5-  year log diﬀerence –1.001 1.625 –1.001 –3.578 0.720
(0.470) (0.465) (0.470) (1.961) (0.105)
With controls
Levels 0.225 0.043 0.236 0.153 0.655
(0.159) (0.722) (0.424) (0.142) (0.292)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
0.374 –1.541 1.071 0.372 –0.326
(0.087) (0.395) (0.213) (0.072) (0.189)
5- year  diﬀerence –0.048 1.231 –0.474 –0.096 1.052
(0.096) (0.338) (0.197) (0.053) (0.172)
5-  year log diﬀerence 0.506 0.999 –0.789 –1.397 0.665
  (1.022)   (0.242)   (0.454)   (0.968)   (0.089)
Notes: UE   the share of the population unemployed; EMP   the share of the population in 
work; SCH   the share of the population in school and not in work. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.Incentives to Retire, Employment of the Old and of the Young in Sweden    3 1 5
The ﬁ  rst row shows the speciﬁ  cation where the rates in levels have been 
used for both the dependent and the independent variables. As can be seen 
in the results of the upper panel in table 10.3, when excluding the controls, 
there is a positive and signiﬁ  cant relation between the unemployment rate 
of the young and labor force participation of the old. This result is in line 
with the idea that the labor force participation of the old indeed crowd out 
employment possibilities for younger workers, resulting in a higher unem-
ployment rate in this age group. The results for the other two outcome mea-
sures, employment rate and share in schooling, in this age group also give 
similar results. The results in table 10.4 show that relation can be attributed 
to the female subsample. For males, the results reveal a completely reversed 
relation, that is, that a higher labor force participation among older work-
ers tends to decrease the unemployment rate among younger workers. The 
results also show that when we add controls to the speciﬁ  cation, the signiﬁ  -
cance of the pooled sample as well as the female subsample is lost. However, 
the inverse relation for the male subsample is robust for including controls.
The results for the prime aged age group are somewhat diﬀerent. For the 
Table 10.4  Regression results on the direct eﬀect between labor force participation 
of older workers and employment of younger workers (males and 
females separately, no controls)
Youth 16–24 Prime 25–54
    UE   EMP   SCH   UE   EMP
Levels
  Men –0.291 1.375 –1.096 –0.241 0.549
(0.041) (0.182) (0.123) (0.036) (0.074)
  Women 0.092 –0.362 0.724 0.098 1.030
(0.020) (0.131) (0.078) (0.019) (0.080)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
  Men –0.240 1.312 –1.090 –0.219 0.529
(0.047) (0.185) (0.113) (0.040) (0.076)
  Women 0.095 –0.480 0.767 0.113 0.849
(0.021) (0.138) (0.073) (0.019) (0.098)
5- year  diﬀerence
  Men –0.560 1.324 –0.514 –0.472 0.621
(0.175) (0.554) (0.281) (0.131) (0.206)
  Women –2.304 2.363 –1.468 –5.216 1.348
(0.165) (0.431) (0.490) (1.827) (0.151)
5-  year log diﬀerence
  Men –8.583 2.331 –1.448 –9.789 0.611
(2.656) (0.784) (0.769) (3.260) (0.175)
  Women
 
–3.513 2.323 –1.715 –6.291 1.007
  (1.197)   (0.263)   (0.333)   (1.237)   (0.139)
Note: See table 10.3 notes.316        Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson
pooled sample and the speciﬁ  cation without controls, the results on the 
unemployment and employment rates as dependent variable are contra-
dictory. The results in table 10.4 show that the result for unemployment, 
indicating a positive relation between the unemployment rate of the prime 
aged workers and the labor force participation rate of the older, can be 
attributed to the female subsample. Again, this result loses signiﬁ  cance in 
both the pooled and the female subsample when controls are added to the 
speciﬁ  cation. However, the positive relation between the employment rate 
among the prime aged and the labor force participation rate of the elderly 
applies in both the male and female subsamples and are robust to adding 
controls in all samples.
The second row in table 10.3 shows the results of the regression in levels, 
but when the independent variable, the labor force participation rate of the 
older workers, is lagged by three years. As for the previous set of results, 
there is a positive relation between the labor force participation of the old 
and the unemployment rate of the young that can be attributed to the female 
subsample. In the male subsample, the relation is reversed. In this speciﬁ  ca-
tion, the results are generally robust for including controls.
Table 10.5  Regression results on the direct eﬀect between labor force participation of 
older workers and employment of younger workers (males and females 
separately, with controls)
Youth 16–24 Prime Age 25–54
    UE   EMP   SCH   UE   EMP
Levels
  Men –0.501 1.622 –0.923 –0.474 0.761
(0.112) (0.444) (0.257) (0.094) (0.174)
  Women 0.214 0.600 0.166 0.112 1.755
(0.149) (0.823) (0.502) (0.142) (0.351)
3-  year lag on elderly 
employment
  Men –0.391 1.483 –0.938 –0.438 0.726
(0.169) (0.626) (0.349) (0.142) (0.252)
  Women 0.338 –1.638 1.248 0.346 0.080
(0.080) (0.446) (0.246) (0.072) (0.264)
5- year  diﬀerence
  Men 0.296 –1.650 0.822 0.224 –0.461
(0.129) (0.382) (0.238) (0.075) (0.140)
  Women 0.008 1.702 –0.577 –0.097 2.000
(0.095) (0.372) (0.208) (0.055) (0.284)
5-  year log diﬀerence
  Men 1.838 –0.835 1.033 3.895 –0.080
(1.687) (0.407) (0.739) (1.816) (0.098)
  Women
 
 1.606 1.407 –0.879 –0.769 1.365
(1.088)   (0.284)   (0.478)   (1.038)   (0.178)
Note: See table 10.3 notes.Incentives to Retire, Employment of the Old and of the Young in Sweden    3 1 7
Any causal relation between the labor force participation of the old and 
unemployment of the young is likely to show up if we relate changes, rather 
than levels, that is, the following model:
(2) ln  Uyoung,t 1   ln Uyoung,t        (ln LFPold,t 1   ln LFPold,t) 
     (ln Xt 1   ln Xt)   εt 1   εt.
We use ﬁ  ve-  year lags and show results from levels as well as logged data.
For the diﬀerenced data, the results indicate complimentarity between the 
labor force participation of the old and employment of the young or prime 
aged. This applies for the speciﬁ  cations without controls for both the male 
and female subsamples. However, the statistical signiﬁ  cance of the results is, 
in most cases, lost when controls are included in the speciﬁ  cations. In some 
cases, the sign is reversed and still signiﬁ  cant when controls are included in 
the male and female subsamples.
10.6    Conclusions
As in most other industrialized economies, there has been a gradual de-
crease in the labor force participation of older male workers in Sweden since 
the beginning of the 1960s. At the same time, the income security system 
has gradually become more generous, primarily through the introduction 
and maturity of the income- related national supplementary pension system 
(ATP) and more generous eligibility rules in the Disability Insurance pro-
gram. It has been hypothesized that the access to the more generous income 
security system for older workers could explain the development toward a 
lower labor force participation in this group. In this paper, we have tried to 
get empirical support for this hypothesis. Moreover, we have tried to link 
the labor force participation rate among older workers to the employment 
rate among younger workers.
On some aspects, we have found empirical support for a relation between 
the development of the income security system and labor force participa-
tion rates among older workers. First, the changes in the normal retirement 
ages did have an apparent eﬀect on the labor force participation rates of 
workers older than age sixty- six. Second, the more generous eligibility rules 
in the Disability Insurance program and the opening of the possibilities to 
be awarded Disability Insurance for labor market reasons seem to have an 
eﬀect on the labor force participation rate in the group aged between sixty 
and sixty- four. Third, the stricter eligibility rules in the Disability Insurance 
in the beginning of the 1990s did at least aﬀect the inﬂ  ow to the Disability 
Insurance program although it is unclear if it in the end aﬀected the labor 
force participation rates among the older workers.
On the other hand, we did not ﬁ  nd unambiguous empirical support for the 
hypothesis that the more generous pension beneﬁ  ts in the national system 
did have an eﬀect on labor force participation rates. Although there are rela-318        Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson
tively few who claim old age pension beneﬁ  ts before the normal retirement 
age, the more generous beneﬁ  ts may have aﬀected the inﬂ  ow to the Disability 
Insurance. If this was the case, however, we would have witnessed an increase 
in this inﬂ  ow much earlier, already in the beginning of the 1960s, than in the 
early 1970s when it actually happened.
On the second research question, to what extent a high labor force par-
ticipation rate among older workers tends to “crowd out” employment pos-
sibilities for the younger, we ﬁ  nd no empirical support for this being the case. 
On the contrary, most of the empirical results suggest a positive relation 
between labor force participation of older workers and employment of the 
young.
There are at least two reasons to believe that regression models where 
the labor force participation is used as explanatory variable and diﬀerent 
measures of employment of younger workers as dependent variable will 
give biased results. First, there may be a spurious regression eﬀect through 
unmeasured business- cycle eﬀects driving both higher labor force participa-
tion rates among the older workers and lower unemployment rates among 
young workers. Second, for at least some eras covered by the period under 
study, a secular trend toward higher female labor force participation and a 
trend toward higher youth unemployment may have aﬀected the results.
The diﬀerent sources of potential bias go in diﬀerent directions, and the 
labor force trends diﬀer for men and women. To resolve this, which calls for 
further research, some form of exogenous variation in labor force participa-
tion is needed.
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